【Article by IDAS】
On 10 April 2026, the International Doctoral Program on Asia-Pacific Studies (IDAS) hosted a guest lecture by Mr. Roy Kamphausen, Special Advisor to the President and Senior Fellow for Chinese Security Studies at the National Bureau of Asian Research. Drawing on two decades of leading research on the People's Liberation Army, Mr. Kamphausen presented a net assessment of Deterrence, Crisis Management, and Escalation control: themes from five years of NBR-IndoPacom PLA conference.
Mr. Kamphausen’s NBR-IndoPacom PLA conference discussions from 2021 to 2025 showed how China’s military strategy and crisis behavior have evolved amid ongoing structural challenges. Mr. Kamphausen started the presentation with the 2021 conference, China introduced integrated joint operations guidelines in 2020, aimed at building a modern force with precision strike, stealth, and AI capabilities. They also introduced the term “integrated strategic deterrence”, which combines both military and non-military capabilities in an effort to protect China's interests. At the same time, its rapid nuclear expansion raised concerns, particularly if China does not participate in any security dialogues, as there would be few mechanisms to constrain its capabilities. A key difference with the United States was already clear: the U.S. tends to manage crises to restore the status quo, while China sees them as opportunities to reshape outcomes.
By 2022 and 2023, the conference observed that China increasingly treated low-level crises as useful tools to advance territorial claims, test alliances, and pressure smaller states. Coercive force has become more central to China’s strategy, especially toward weaker states, though Beijing continues to avoid direct confrontation with the United States. At the same time, this behavior has strengthened U.S. alliances rather than weakening them. China also drew lessons from the war in Ukraine, particularly the role of nuclear signaling in deterring external intervention.
In 2024, discussions turned to the PLA’s progress toward Xi Jinping’s goal of building a “world-class military” by 2049, with modernization expected by 2035. However, Xi has never clearly defined what “world-class” means, leaving the concept open to interpretation. He noted that China still tends to measure military strength by individual service branches rather than integrated joint operations, which runs counter to its stated goals. Despite rapid modernization, key challenges remain, including corruption and equipment limitations. Efforts to integrate AI also face constraints due to the PLA’s centralized command structure.
In the most recent year of the conference, 2025, the discussions focused on how China uses “comprehensive national power” (CNP) to assess its strength and pressure smaller states, though this approach is less effective against major powers or coalitions. China also views conflict and escalation differently, believing it can move between levels of confrontation rather than follow a linear path. At the same time, its expanding nuclear arsenal raises concerns that China may be moving beyond its traditional deterrence strategy.
During the open forum, Mr. Kamphausen argued that the U.S. has not withdrawn from the global system but is behaving more unilaterally and showing less commitment to its own established rules. He noted that Japan’s military buildup has been gradual and long-standing, with rising tensions with China, but a major conflict in the near future is unlikely. Smaller countries are expected to continue balancing strategies—such as hedging or aligning—without fully breaking ties with the U.S.
On U.S.–China competition, he suggested it differs from past power transitions, highlighting that China’s strategy lacks real battlefield testing and is somewhat self-referential. He questioned the relevance of the “Thucydides Trap,” arguing it applies mainly to culturally similar rivals. He also emphasized U.S. unpredictability as a strategic advantage and described its Taiwan policy as maintaining the status quo through a “not today” approach—deterring China by ensuring it sees no immediate opportunity for military action.
In his closing remarks, Mr. Kamphausen clarified that 2027 was never an official timeline for a Taiwan invasion, but rather a misinterpretation that gained traction in Washington. He raised two key concerns: first, that assessments downplaying the immediacy of a conflict could reduce urgency in both the U.S. and Taiwan, potentially encouraging risk-taking by China; and second, that even subtle shifts in U.S. language on Taiwan independence could be interpreted by Beijing as weakening commitment. Looking ahead, he suggested future discussions would examine whether China’s ambitions extend beyond Taiwan, particularly if unification remains out of reach.